Email Enquiry

Refinery in Texas Evacuated After Fire Explosion

Initial Email Enquiry –

Colleagues,

A spokesperson "said an internal investigation was also under way, following a heightened security alert from recent reports from the FBI and industry groups that refineries in this area might be targeted by terrorists. "That was one of our first concerns" with the blasts, the spokesperson told the Texas City Sun in Wednesday's editions. "But there is no indication of that, none at all."

When I read this I was reminded of incidents that took place in South Africa during the 1980's when the "struggle" was at it's most intense stage and we encountered real terrorist attacks at our refineries and bomb explosions in the public areas such as restaurants, etc. and would like to share one incident with you as an important lesson we, as emergency responders, learned the hard way.

"Do not get side-tracked by the warning of terrorist activities when you respond to an incident! That will inevitabily lead to wrong decisions by Incident Commanders"

Why do I start with this statement??

Case study:

A bomb exploded in the central business area of Pretoria in the proximity of the South African Army Head Quarters in the early eighties with devistating effect - major damage and lots of people injured and killed.

Exactly one year later (to the date) the Emergency Services were placed on "high alert" for a possible "Celebration of the Church Street Bomb".

Late at night a call came in that the Sasol Fuel Distribution Depot in Pretoria West was on fire. When the first crew arrived on the scene the Security Guard on duty informed them that he heared what sounded like water falling (rain) and then a loud explosion - the next minute one of the storage tanks was on fire and he raised the alarm.

The day after the incident I was requested to assist in the investigation into the incident. Days and months passed and numerous interviews with responders took place in preparation for the legal action that followed from the incident.

This incident was badly handled by the Emergency Services resulting in the death of three fire fighters and this is why I want to share one of the lessons we learned from this incident.

It was exactly one year after the "Church Street Bomb" and Emergency Services were on high alert, as mentioned previously. From a discussion I had with the first officer that arrived on the scene shortly after the fire (the next day) he told me that his first (and only) thought he had in his mind was that this was the celebration they were put on alert for - this was sabotage and nothing less - the storage tank was shot with some sort of missile and that caused a hole in the roof of the tank that ignited. All his efforts and that of the more senior staff called in (Chief Fire Officer, etc) were based on the idea that the tank was sabotaged and lead to total wrong mitigation actions applied.

What really happened was that the morning shift operator was busy transferring fuel (dosing) from the feed tank to the final product tank earlier the day and never informed his relieve operator that this operation was still ongoing when he went off duty. The afternoon shift went off duty at 22h00 (and it was later proven that this operator never did any plant inspection through-out his whole afternoon shift) leaving the depot in the control of the Security Guard - no night shift at that time. At approximately 03h00 the final product tank started overflowing through the conservation vent ("sounded like water falling") and the vapours were ignited after a while by an open flame in the neighbouring premises ("explosion"). This resulted in a fire in the dike area as well as a vent fire with the resulting running fire down the side of the tank as transfer of product was still happening.

The first emergency crew that arrived immediately activated the base foam injection system (???) and because the foam system is coupled via the product line, in the process closed the valve between the feed tank and the final product tank. The pump stopped as a result of over pressure against the closed valve.

The tank however kept overflowing because of the base foam injection system being in operation. After the roof seperated (remeber the "weak seam" between roof and shell on fixed roof tanks?) the product in the dome fell out of the tank, causing air to be introduced through the conservation vent into the tank, resulting in the formation of an explosive mixture under the roof of the tank. This mixture ignited further seperating the roof, forcing product violently out of the tank and spraying the product all over the fire fighters some thirty meters away, killing three fire fighters.

What is the lesson I want to share??

The Incident Commanders only had one thought in their minds - terrorist attack - they never realised that the tank was merely overflowing and by stopping the transfer they would have been left with a vent fire that could have been easily extinguised.

They were side-tracked by the external threat of a terrorist attack to the extend that they could not distinguish between that and a normal incident.

Yes, I know there is a real danger and the threat is real, but do not automatically accept it is a terrorist attack - first think normal until proven otherwise - learn from the above real life experience.

Regards and keep safe and alert!

End of email correspondence on Topic to date.

Author’s identities are concealed for privacy and security reasons. Further information on the information contained in this topic can be directed to the JOIFF secretariaty.