Incident Report

 

Subject:                        Buncefield reports 06 and 07

Date of Email reporting Incident:   Wed 18/07/2007

Report Detail:

I attach a copy of the Buncefield board of investigation's (MIIB's) 6th report, which makes recommendations on emergency preparedness for, response to and recovery from incidents.
The report is wider ranging than our previous report (on the design and operation of fuel storage sites) published on 29 March 2007. In our latest report we identify four main areas for attention:

    • The need for site operators to reassess credible major incident scenarios following Buncefield.
    • The need to manage an incident, should one begin, on the site and prevent its escalation.
    • The need to prepare for and responding to a major incident off-site. This is by far the largest and most diverse part of the report, containing seventeen of the thirty two recommendations.
The need to plan, at the outset, for the recovery from an incident in order to return the community to social normality as soon as possible.

There has been extensive consultation with stakeholders across the UK and the Board's report draws together many of the lessons that have been learned by others into a single set of recommendations, and makes clear who should be responsible for implementing them.

Additional Documentation:

Buncefield_Workgroup 06

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The Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB) has been overseeing a comprehensive investigation of the incident and has published a number of reports on its findings. One important aspect of the incident was that a severe explosion took place, which would not have been anticipated in any major hazard assessment of the oil storage depot before the incident.

The Board invited a team of explosion experts from academia and industry to form a working group to advise on the work that would be required to explain the severity of the Buncefield explosion.

The Advisory Group identified a number of possible explosion scenarios but within the time available could not fully test them against the considerable amount of information available. Nevertheless, the Group has concluded that there is a strong likelihood that the cause of the severe explosion at Buncefield can be explained, although this will require further, more detailed work. However, it is the opinion of the Group that a comprehensive explanation is unlikely to be found without the conduct of further experimental and theoretical research.

It is recommended that a joint industry project be initiated with the task of completing the assessment started by the Advisory Group and, on the basis of its findings, defining the requirements of the research to be carried out in a second phase of the project.
Guidance to industry and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) should be a primary deliverable of the project.

Additonal Documentation:

Buncefield_Workgroup 07